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divergence between English and Scottish partnership law? 
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1 Introduction 
The existence and extent of the criminal liability of partnerships and partners has 
historically been the subject of scant legislative, judicial or academic attention.1 
However, in 2008 the case of Balmer v HM Advocate2 highlighted a serious defect 
in this area of law, namely that the commission of a criminal offence which would 
otherwise lead to conviction and the imposition of a penalty might not do so if the 
wrongdoer was a partnership.  In Balmer a fire occurred at a nursing home 
operated by a Scottish partnership, leading to the deaths of 14 elderly residents.  
The partnership subsequently dissolved but its former partners were prosecuted 
under ss3 and 33 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974.  Section 3 
provides that it is an offence for an employer to fail to discharge its duty under 
s33 to conduct its undertaking in such a way as to ensure, so far as reasonably 
practicable, that persons not in its employment are not thereby exposed to risks 
to their health or safety.  The High Court of Judiciary in Scotland held that since 
the partnership was the employer, it was the proper accused and not the 
partners. However, because it had been dissolved, it had no continuing legal 
personality and therefore could no longer be prosecuted.  
 
At issue in Balmer was the impact of the dissolution of the partnership on its 
criminal liability and that of its partners.  However, if similar facts arose in 
England, a further obstacle to liability could arise because an English partnership, 
unlike a Scottish partnership, is not a separate legal person3 and so, even absent 
dissolution, its capacity to incur criminal liability is unclear.   
 
There are a number of rationales underpinning the imposition of criminal liability; 
in particular moral blame, harm to others and deterrence.  However, in the 
development of the criminal law the focus has been on individual autonomy, and 
considerable legal difficulty has been encountered in determining whether and 
how the law should be adapted to impose liability on businesses, in which 
intentions and actions may be located in a wide variety of connected individual 
actors.4   
 
This article assumes that a business should be subject to criminal liability for a 
number of reasons.  First, a business is formed of individuals who are capable of 
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1 There are a few reported cases from the 18th and 19th centuries concerning excise offences 
committed by partners (for example Attorney General v Burges 145 ER 654 (1726) Bunbury 223 and 
R v Manning 92 ER 1236 (1738) 2 Comyns 616) which are discussed briefly in texts such as W Watson 
“A Treatise of the Law of Partnership” (1794) A. Strahan and W. Woodfall, London at pp254-276 
available at http://archive.org/details/atreatiselawpar00watsgoog [accessed 22 October 2013], N Gow 
“A Practical Treatise on the Law of Partnership” (1825) Charles Hunter, London, at pp234-238 
available at http://archive.org/details/apracticaltreat00gowgoog [accessed 22 October 2013] and H 
Cary “A Practical Treatise on the Law of Partnership” (1834) J.S. Littell, Philadelphia, USA, reprinted in 
“Legal Treatises, 1800-1926” Making of the Modern Law Print Editions, USA, at pp62-63.   
2 [2008] HCJAC; 44, 2008 SLT 799.   
3 Section 4(2) of the Partnership Act 1890.   
4 See further B Fisse and J Braithwaite “The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: 
Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability” (1988) 11 Sydney Law Review 468-513 at pp474-475 
and A von Hirsch “Extending the Harm Principle: ‘Remote’ Harms and Fair Imputation” in “Harm and 
Culpability” AP Simester and ATH Smith eds, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996.    
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moral decisionmaking and culpability.5 In any event, not all crimes require a 
mental element and in those that do, intention is not synonymous with 
immorality. Second, both corporate and unincorporated bodies have 
decisionmaking structures for which they can be expected to take responsibility.6 
Third, although businesses may perform valuable social and economic functions 
which benefit employees and wider society, these benefits can be outweighed by 
the harm caused by their criminal activities. Business can be responsible not only 
for technical and regulatory offences but also for “acts of violence that in their 
potential scope and impact far outweigh the effects of similar culpable acts 
performed by individuals”.7  Fourth, given that businesses can be responsible for 
the commission of crimes, and given their potential scope, it is important that the 
law deters as well as punishes such crimes.  Conviction itself is a penalty in its 
own right, but it may also lead to financial penalties which go to the very heart of 
why the business exists, or trigger prosecution for individual offences.  
Punishment of the business can have indirect consequences for individuals by 
impacting on their interests in that business (and, in partnerships, through the 
personal liability of partners for any fines which the firm is unable to pay). Fifth, 
in economic terms the consequences of the harm should not fall solely on the 
victim of the crime, but should at least be shared with the business which was 
responsible for it, albeit that the business can only suffer financial harm, either 
directly or indirectly in the form of damage to its reputation.   
 
The more problematic issue is how such liability might be imposed.  The failed 
prosecution in Balmer led to a Scottish Law Commission (“SLC”) Discussion 
Paper8 and a Report9 on the Criminal Liability of Partnerships, followed by a 
Scotland Office consultation10 and, ultimately, the Partnerships (Prosecution) 
(Scotland) Act 2013 (“the PPS Act”) which came into force on 26 April 2013 and 
applies to proceedings ongoing on that day or commenced subsequently, 
regardless of the date of the offence.11  However, while the PPS Act attempts to 
prevent Scottish partnerships from avoiding criminal liability as a result of their 
partnership status, English law has not yet addressed this potential loophole, 
although the Law Commission of England and Wales examined some related 
issues in its Consultation Paper on “Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts”.12  
 
The mechanisms by which liability might be imposed on English partnerships and 
their partners will be examined throughout this article from a number of 
perspectives.  The first part will consider whether an English partnership can in 
principle incur liability separately to its partners at all.  The second part will then 
consider the mechanisms that might be employed to impose liability on a 
partnership; in particular the way in which acts and motives might be imputed to 
it through identification or vicarious liability.  The third part will assess the impact 
																																																								
5 Fisse and Braithwaite op. cit. 4 at pp 475-510 and A von Hirsch “Extending the Harm Principle: 
‘Remote’ Harms and Fair Imputation” in AP Simester and ATH Smith eds, “Harm and Culpability” 
(1996) Clarendon Press, Oxford.   
6 Fisse and Braithwaite op. cit. n4 at pp 475-510.   
7	A Norrie “Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law” (1993) Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, London.  	
8 (2011) DP 150, available at http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/publications/discussion-papers-and-
consultative-memoranda/2010-present/ [accessed 22 October 2013].    
9 (2011) Scot Law Com No 224, available at 
http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/publications/reports/2010-present/ [accessed 22 October 2013].  
10 “Reforming the law on Scottish unincorporated associations and criminal liability of Scottish 
partnerships” (2012), available at http://www.scotlandoffice.gov.uk/scotlandoffice/10798.136.html 
[accessed 22 October 2013].   
11 Section 8 of the PPS Act. 		
12 No 195 (2010), available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/areas/criminal-liability-in-
regulatory-contexts.htm [accessed 22 October 2013].   
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of dissolution on the liability of the partnership liability – the issue that arose in 
Balmer.  The fourth part will turn to the circumstances in which an individual 
partner can, as a matter of civil or criminal law, be held liable for the criminal acts 
of other partners.  The fifth part will then assess the impact of the dissolution of 
the partnership on partner liability.  The penultimate part will consider the extent 
to which similar problems exist in relation to the liability of LLPs and their 
members.  Finally, a conclusion will be drawn as to the extent to which English 
law is in need of reform, and whether the PPS Act could provide a basis for this or 
a bespoke English solution is required.   
 
 
2 The criminal liability of partnerships  
a) Whether partnerships can incur liability 
Although much of partnership law is common to both England and Scotland, 
being based on the Partnership Act 1890 in both jurisdictions, there is one key 
difference of particular significance to the issue of criminal liability: a Scottish 
partnership is a separate legal person from its partners, but an English 
partnership is not.13  This reflects the greater historical influence of the 
continental societas on Scottish commercial law as compared to English law,14 
and enables Scottish law, in the form of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 
1995, to provide that a partnership may be subject to summary (s143) or solemn 
(s70: equivalent to procedure on indictment in England) prosecution in the same 
way as an individual.  
 
However, in contrast to the position of Scottish partnerships, whether an English 
partnership can incur criminal liability is unclear, as the Law Commission of 
England and Wales and the SLC argued in their Report on Partnership Law (”the 
Joint Report”).15  Certain statutes expressly acknowledge the possibility of the 
criminal liability of partnerships,16 perhaps most famously the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 200717 but, in relation to statutes 
which do not, confusion stems from s5 of and Sch 1 to the Interpretation Act 
1978.  These provide that, “unless the contrary intention appears”, the word  
“person” in any Act “includes a body of persons corporate or unincorporate”.  An 
“unincorporate” body can include a partnership, but the meaning of “contrary 
intention” is unclear.   
 
The Law Commissions in their Joint Report considered that “some judicial dicta“ 
suggested that an English partnership could not, in principle, commit a criminal 
offence, although “some old statutes” (not further specified by them) showed an 
intention or assumption that it could commit an offence under that statute.18 The 
																																																								
13 Section 4(2) of the Partnership Act.  As a result, partnership property can only be owned by the 
partners collectively, not the partnership itself, which gives rise to further difficulties in relation to the 
criminal law; in R v Bonner [1970] 1 WLR 838 the Court of Appeal held that a partner could be guilty 
of the theft of partnership property belonging to himself and his co-partners, but in R v Troth (1980) 
71 Cr App R 1 it quashed an order for forfeiture of partnership property stolen by a partner on the 
grounds that although such an order might be possible, it was inappropriate because “it leads to 
difficulties which may be so onerous as to make it not worthwhile making the order in the first place”.   
14 W Holdsworth “A History of English Law” (1966) Methuen & Co Ltd and Sweet and Maxwell, London, 
Vol VIII, pp195-199.   
15 Law Commission of England and Wales and Scottish Law Commission Report on Partnership Law 
(2003) Law Com No 283 and Scot Law Com No 192, available at 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/areas/partnership-law.htm [accessed 22 October 2013] at 4.43-
4.47.   
16 See, for example, s197 of the Legal Services Act 2007, ss31 and 70 of the Serious Crime Act 2007, 
s1255 of the Companies Act 2006, s187 of the Licensing Act 2003, s400 of the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000, s101 of the Trade Marks Act 1994, s285 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
1988 and s102C of the Transport Act 1968.   
17 Sections 1(2)(d) and 14.   
18 Op. cit. n15 at 4.43.   
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only “dicta” actually cited by the Law Commissions were the comments of Lord 
Goddard CJ who gave the leading judgment in Davey v Shawcroft.19 He held that 
an unincorporated body could be a “person” for the purposes of the definition of a 
coal merchant in the Coal Distribution Order 1943, but not for the purposes of 
criminal liability; “[i]f an offence were committed in the ordinary course of the 
firm's business, it may well be that each individual partner would be liable to 
prosecution, though they would have to be prosecuted as individuals and not in 
the firm's name”.20   
 
However, in R v Clerk to Croydon Justices Ex p Chief Constable of Kent21 the 
court held that the “person” on whom a fixed penalty could be imposed under s36 
of the Transport Act 1982 (and the provisions of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 
1988 which replaced it) could include an unincorporated body, since there was 
nothing from which a contrary intention appeared.  Furthermore, in R v L and 
another the Court of Appeal reviewed of a number of statutes which made specific 
provision for the criminal liability of unincorporated associations (a term which, in 
the absence of express exclusion, includes partnerships) and concluded that it 
was  
”impossible to draw from them any general proposition that there is a 
form of enactment which is to be expected if an unincorporated 
association is to be criminally liable, and of which the absence signals a 
contrary intention for the purposes of s5 of the 1978 Act”.22   
It held that the absence from the statute at issue23 of a specific provision making 
an unincorporated association criminally liable did not constitute contrary intent.  
Nor did the absence of a clause imposing personal liability on members of an 
unincorporated association, even where the statute made express provision for 
the liability of officers of a corporate body. The same argument would, it is 
submitted, apply to statutes which expressly provide also for the liability of 
partners in a Scottish partnership, but not the liability of partners in English 
partnerships.24   
 
The Law Commissions proposed, in their Joint Report, that an English partnership 
should not be capable of committing an offence unless a statute “expressly or by 
necessary implication” provided that it could.25  It is submitted that the term 
“necessary implication” would create uncertainty, and indeed the Law 
Commissions themselves stated that this proposal was merely a “workable 
holding position” pending a more thorough consideration of the criminal liability of 
partnerships.26 Unfortunately, the Law Commission of England and Wales’ 
subsequent Consultation Paper on Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts only 
made proposals in relation to the liability of companies,27 and these are 
themselves on hold pending a full scale project on corporate liability in the 
future.28   
 
																																																								
19 [1948] 1 All ER 827.   
20 Op. cit. n19 at 828.   
21 [1991] RTR 257.   
22 [2009] EWCA Crim 1970 [2009] 1 All ER 786, per Hughes LJ at para 22.   
23 The Water Resources Act 1991.  See also, for example, the Electricity Act 1989 and the Race 
Relations Act 2004.   
24 See, for example, s72 of the Competition Act 1998, s4 of the Property Misdescriptions Act 1991 and 
s88 of the Energy Act 2011.   
25 Op. cit. n15 at 4.45 and 4.47, and clause 8 of the joint draft Bill.   
26 Op. cit. n15 at 4.46.   
27 Op. cit. n12 at 5.110. 
28 Law Commission of England and Wales, statement available at 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/areas/criminal-liability-in-regulatory-contexts.htm [accessed 22 
October 2013].   
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To summarise, an English partnership cannot commit a common law offence 
because the Interpretation Act does not apply to common law offences, and 
whether it can properly be charged in relation to a particular statutory offence will 
often be unclear.  The problem that arose in the Scottish context in Balmer29 is 
therefore less likely to arise in England and Wales because a partnership cannot 
be liable for some offences, irrespective of dissolution. However, the possibility 
remains that criminal liability will arise but will be extinguished by dissolution 
prior to prosecution.   
 
 
b) When and how partnerships can incur liability 
Because criminal law is predicated on individual autonomy and responsibility, it 
does not easily accommodate wrongdoing by a business.  Even if a partnership – 
English or Scottish - can be charged, the need to prove actus reus and, in the 
absence of strict liability or statutory duty,30 mens rea, may necessitate either 
finding the partnership vicariously liable for the behaviour of its partners (or 




The courts have on occasion been prepared to find a company criminally liable 
where the actus reus and any necessary mens rea have been committed by 
persons whose acts and state of mind are identified with and can be attributed to 
the company.32  The same approach can be applied to other legal persons such as 
an LLP or Scottish partnership, and to an English partnership in so far as it is 
treated as a person for the purposes of a particular statute by virtue of the 
Interpretation Act 1978.  Indeed, since in most partnerships and LLPs the 
partners or members will be involved both in management and the day to day 
work of the business, attribution may be easier.  
 
In relation to companies, such persons are typically its “directors and managers 
who represent the directing mind and will of the company, and control what it 
does”.  33 The legal fiction that a company can have mind or a will has enabled 
the prosecution of corporate wrongdoers, but the essential artificiality of the 
device has led to a number of difficulties, and the courts have further found it 
necessary to impute to the company the thoughts and acts of persons who are 
not part of its directing mind and will34 in order to ensure that corporate liability is 
not avoided simply by directors delegating their functions.35 The Dutch courts 
																																																								
29 Op. cit. n2.   
30 For example, s7 of the Bribery Act 2010 imposes liability on a commercial organisation (including a 
partnership) if a person associated with it bribes another person intending to obtain business or a 
business advantage for the organisation (unless it had in place adequate procedures to prevent such 
conduct). 
31 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153, per Lord Reid at pp170-175 and the SLC 
Discussion Paper op. cit. n8 at 3.29.  See also TH Jones and MGA Christie “Criminal Liability” 4th edn 
(2008) W Green, London at 13.27-13.28  
32 See, for example, Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass op. cit. n31, Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v 
Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] AC 705 and R v Andrews Weatherfoil [1972] 1 WLR 118.  See further 
the Law Commission of England and Wales “Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts” op. cit. n12 at 
Part 5, “D Milman “Entity status issues in the UK law of business organisations and related entities: 
recurrent uncertainty” (2011) 306 Co LN 1, and A Pinto and M Evans “Corporate Criminal Liability” 2nd 
edn (2008) at Ch 4.   
33 HL Bolton (Engineering Co) Ltd v T.J. Graham & Sons Ltd [1957] 1 QB 159 at 172.  
34 See, for example, Moore v I Bresler [1944] 2 All ER 515 and R v Rozeik [1996] 1 WLR 159; cf R v 
St Regis Paper Company Ltd [2011] EWCA Crim 2527 [2012] 1 Cr App R 14.   
35 See Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission [1995] 2 AC 500, R v 
British Steel plc [1995] 1 WLR 1356 and Director General of Fair Trading v Pioneer Concrete (UK) Ltd 
[1995] AC 456.  See further E Ferran “Corporate attribution and the directing mind and will” (2011) 
127 LQR 239.   
This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication which 
has been edited, corrected and updated after this draft was prepared.  It should not be cited in 
this draft version without the consent of the author.	
	
	 6
have similarly imposed liability in respect of acts or omissions which can 
reasonably be attributed to a company because they took place within its 
“scope”,36 and US courts have held that companies, and indeed partnerships, may 
be held criminally responsible for the acts of their officers, agents or employees if 
those acts are of the kind which that person is authorised to perform and he 
intended to benefit it.37  
 
Whether a particular person’s thoughts and acts will be identified with those of a 
particular business in a particular scenario will depend on the interpretation of the 
substantive rule of law at issue.38  This approach was supported by the Law 
Commission of England and Wales in its Consultation Paper on Criminal Liability in 
Regulatory Contexts, but only in the absence of its preferred solution of specific 
provisions in criminal legislation indicating the basis on which a company may be 
found liable.39  Such a solution could also provide greater certainty for 
partnerships if extended to them. 
 
A number of other jurisdictions already make specific legislative provision in 
relation to companies.  For example, in Germany §30 of the 
Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz (Regulatory Offences Act 1968) lists those persons, 
including both senior managers and more junior employees, whose acts may 
engage the liability of a corporate (or unincorporated) body if they have acted as 
a representative of that body.40  The Australian Criminal Code 1995 adopts a 
model of attribution in the event of express or implied authority, and provides 
that such authority may be evidenced by the conduct of management or by the 
corporate culture.41 In both Italy42 and Hungary43 the relevant legislation specifies 
that a range of persons from senior managers to employees or agents may 
trigger liability, but the circumstances in which this may occur vary according to 
their seniority.  In contrast, the French Penal Code provides that corporate 
liability may only result from the actions of organs or representatives that legally 
																																																								
36 Ie are committed by someone who works for the company (whether under a formal employment 
contract or not), form part of the normal business of the firm, profit the firm, or are accepted by the 
firm even though it had the power to prevent them (Dutch Supreme Court (DSC), Oct 21 2003, NJ 
2006, 328 (Drijfmest); see BF Keulen and E Gritter “Corporate Criminal Liability in the Netherlands” in 
M Pieth and R Ivory eds “Corporate Criminal Liability: Emergence, Convergence and Risk” (2011) 
Springer, Dordrecht, London, at p511).  See also G Stessens “Corporate Criminal Liability: A 
Comparative Perspective” (1994) 43 ICLQ 493 at p508 and C Wells “Corporations and Criminal 
Responsibility” 2nd edn (2001) OUP, Oxford at pp138-139.   
37 New York Central & Hudson River Railway Co v United States, 212 US 481 (1909), United States v 
Armour & Co, 168 F.2d 342 (3rd Cir. 1948) and United States v Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, (1st Cir. 
1982): see U P Nanda “Corporate Criminal Liability in the United States: is a New Approach 
Warranted?” in Pieth and Ivory eds op. cit. n36.  See also Stessens op. cit. n36 at p512 and Wells 
“Corporations and Criminal Responsibility” op. cit. n36 at p132-136.   
38 See, for example, Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission op. cit. n35 
at p506-507.   
39 “Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts” op. cit. n12 at 5.110.  For a critique of the position in 
Scotland, see R Mays “The criminal liability of corporations and Scots law: learning the lessons of 
Anglo-American jurisprudence” (2000) 4(1) Edin LR 46.   
40 M Böse “Corporate Criminal Liability in Germany” in Pieth and Ivory eds op. cit. n36 at 8.22.  See 
also Wells “Corporations and Criminal Responsibility” op. cit. n36 at pp139-140.   
41 Section 12.3(2)(a) and (b); see J Clough and C Mulhern “The Prosecution of Corporations” (2002) 
OUP, Melbourne (Australia), Oxford, at pp140-148.  See also Wells “Corporations and Criminal 
Responsibility” op. cit. n36 at pp136-138.   
42 Article 5 of the Italian Legislative Decree No 231 of 2001; see C de Maglie “Societas Delinquere 
Potest? The Italian Solution” in Pieth and Ivory eds op. cit. n36 at 9.6-9.7.   
43 Article 2(1) of the Hungarian Act CIV of 2001 on Criminal Measures Applicable to Legal Persons; see 
F Santha and S Dobrocsi “Corporate Criminal Liability in Hungary” in Pieth and Ivory eds op. cit. n36 
at 12.4.3.   
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express the company’s will and have acted on behalf of the company, and not by 
mere agents or employees.44  
 
These differing approaches reflect the fundamental mismatch between the 
criminalisation of autonomous individual behaviour, and the complex structures 
and delegation utilised within a typical business.   
 
ii) Vicarious liability 
Vicarious liability does not, generally, form part of the criminal law because a 
defendant is regarded as an autonomous individual and is thus usually liable only 
for his own acts.45  There are a number of exceptions at common law (public 
nuisance46 and contempt) and under statute, particularly where the defendant 
has delegated his statutory duties to another or where acts are attributed to the 
defendant by the statute.47  Furthermore, the identification doctrine discussed 
above has been argued to be a form of vicarious liability.48 
 
However, as a matter of partnership law, s10 of the Partnership Act imposes 
vicarious liability on the firm.  It provides that  
“Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the 
ordinary course of the business of the firm, or with the authority of his co-
partners, loss or injury is caused to any person not being a partner in the 
firm, or any penalty is incurred, the firm is liable therefor to the same 
extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act” 
It is submitted that the express reference to the possibility of a “penalty” being 
incurred as a result of such acts or omissions indicates the inclusion of criminal 
acts.49  Indeed, in Dubai Aluminium Co Ltd v Salaam and others Lord Millet 
declared that “section 10 was drafted in the widest terms to embrace every kind 
of wrong capable of causing damage to non-partners”,50 and in a number of pre-
Partnership Act cases the courts held partners jointly and severally liability for 
excise offences committed by one partner.51 
 
In practice, the requirement in s10 that the wrongful act or omission be 
committed by the partner “in the ordinary course of the business of the firm, or 
with the authority of his co-partners” will often prevent vicarious liability arising.  
For example, in Flynn v Robin Thompson & Partners (A Firm) the Court of Appeal 
held that the alleged assault by a solicitor on the representative of a former client 
who was suing the solicitor’s firm was “so extraordinary and so far removed from 
																																																								
44 K Deckert “Corporate Criminal Liability in France” in Pieth and Ivory eds op. cit. n36 at 5.7.  See 
also Stessens op. cit. n36 at p507 and Wells “Corporations and Criminal Responsibility” op. cit. n36 at 
p139.   
45 Law Commission of England and Wales “Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts” op. cit. n12 at 5.4 
and D. Ormerod “Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law” 13th edn 2011 OUP at 10.2.2.   
46 R v Stephens (1866) LR 1 QB 702.   
47 R (Chief Constable of Northumbria) v Newcastle Magistrates Court [2010] EWHC 935 (Admin) 935, 
judgment of 30 April 2010 unreported at para 32; see also Ormerod n45 at 10.2.2-10.2.3.  
48 See, for example, Fisse and Braithwaite op. cit. n4 at 504, J Gobert and M Punch “Rethinking 
Corporate Crime” (2003) Butterworths, London at p63, Stessens op. cit. n36 at pp506-514 and Wells 
“Corporations and Criminal Responsibility” op. cit. n36 at pp153-155 and “Criminal Liability in England 
and Wales: Past, Present, and Future” in Pieth and Ivory eds op. cit. n36 at 3.3.   
49 See further G Morse “Partnership Law” 7th edn (2010) OUP, Oxford at 4.32.  See also M Blackett-
Ord and S Haren “Partnership Law” 4th edn (2011) Bloomsbury Professional, Haywards Heath at 
19.50.   
50 [2002] UKHL 48 [2003] 2 AC 366 at para 108.  Lord Millett also quoted (at para 106) Winn J in 
Meekins v Henson [1964] 1 QB 472 at 477, who observed that s10 of the Partnership Act produced "a 
necessary equation of a partnership firm with employers for this purpose". The necessity of such an 
equation is self-evident: it would be absurd if a professional firm were vicariously liable for the acts of 
an employee but would not be liable if the same acts had been committed by a partner.   
51 Attorney General v Burges op. cit. n1 and R v Manning op. cit. n1; see also Gow op. cit. n1 at 
pp234-238.   
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the ordinary conduct of an advocate, or anything that might be done with the 
authority of the co-partners, to fall outside the confines of the section”.52  In JJ 
Coughlan v Ruparelia the Court of Appeal held that a solicitor who had been 
involved in a scheme comprising a risk-free investment with a return of 6000% 
had acted outside the ordinary course of business of a solicitor.53 However, in 
Dubai Aluminium itself the House of Lords gave a wide scope to this potentially 
restrictive phrase, holding that drafting agreements for a dishonest purpose could 
be within the ordinary course of business of a solicitor, since drafting them for 
proper purpose would have been.54  Similarly, in Hamlyn v John Houston & Co the 
Court of Appeal held that since it was within the scope of a partner’s authority to 
obtain information about the firm’s competitors by legitimate means, it was 
within his authority to obtain it by illegitimate means such as bribery of a 
competitor’s clerk.55 It stated that  
 “It is too well established by the authorities to be now disputed that a 
principal may be liable for the fraud or other illegal act committed by his 
agent within the general scope of the authority given to him, and even the 
fact that the act of the agent is criminal does not necessarily take it out of 
the scope of his authority”.56 
 
The vicarious liability provisions of s10 of the Partnership Act are supplemented 
by those of s11, which provide that if a partner misapplies money or property 
received by him within the scope of his authority, or received by the partnership, 
the firm is liable to compensate the third party.   
 
A different form of vicarious criminal liability has been recognised where a person 
delegates his statutory duty to another, so as to impose liability on the former if 
the latter commits an offence.57  Although this principle is not one of corporate 
liability,58 it is apt to apply to the delegation of a duty by a board of directors59 or 
the management committee of a partnership or LLP.  However, it is of limited 
application, and the Law Commission of England and Wales has posited its 
abolition and replacement with an offence of failing to prevent an offence being 
committed by a person to whom the running of the business has been 
delegated.60 
 
3 The impact of dissolution on the criminal liability of a partnership 
A second feature of partnership law of key relevance to criminal liability is that of 
automatic dissolution, which means that even where a partnership can properly 
be prosecuted, it may be able to dissolve easily, even accidentally, before the 
prosecution is concluded.  This, of course, was the crux of the problem in Balmer.  
And while a civil claim may still be brought against a partnership after dissolution, 
either in the firm name in England61 or in the names of all partners in Scotland,62 
																																																								
52 (2000) 97(6) LSG 36, (2000) 144 Sol Jo LB 102, per Lord Thorpe at para 13.   
53 [2003] EWCA Civ 1057, [2004] Lloyds Rep PN 4.    
54 Op. cit. n50 per Lord Nicholls at para 36 and Lord Millett at para 130.   
55 [1903] 1 KB 81.   
56 Op. cit. n55 at p85.  See also the cases referred to at n1.     
57 Mousell Brothers Ltd v London and North Western Railway Co [1917] 2 KB 836.   
58 Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts op. cit. n12 at 7.53.   
59 See, for example, R v St Regis Paper Company Ltd op. cit. n34 per Moses LJ at paras 26-29 and 
Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass op. cit. n31 per Lord Reid at p171, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest at 
p180 and Lord Pearson at p193.   
60 Law Commission of England and Wales “Criminal Liability in Regulatory Contexts” op. cit. n12 at 
7.58.   
61 See Rule 5A.1-3 of the Civil Procedure Rules and Re Wenham [1900] 2 QB 698.  It must be the 
name of the firm as at the time the cause of action accrued (Ernst & Young (A Firm) v Butte Mining plc 
(No 2) [1997] 1 WLR 1485).   
62 See further the Law Commissions’ Joint Report op. cit. n15 at 7.1-7.22.   
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the same is not true of criminal prosecution, as demonstrated in Balmer.63  As 
dissolution is effectively the death of the partnership, the position might be 
regarded as equivalent to that for individuals, whose death would frustrate the 
prosecution of a case against them.  The question might then arise as to why the 
failure of the prosecution in Balmer was regarded as so objectionable that the law 
had to be changed to prevent a similar failure in future.  The answer, it is 
submitted, is that separate legal personality in Scotland is accepted as a 
convenient fiction for certain business purposes (as is the recognition of an 
English partnership as a person under the Interpretation Act), but not where it 
might enable protection of the partners against liability for what are in effect their 
actions and intentions.  This is reflected in the fact that the separate legal 
personality of Scottish partnerships is not associated with any limitation of 
partner liability; sections 9 and 10 of the Partnership 1890 impose joint and 
several liability on Scottish partners as they do on English partners.  
 
The Partnership Act provides that, subject to contrary agreement, a partnership 
(English or Scottish) dissolves automatically on the happening of certain events: 
notice of dissolution given by any partner,64 expiry of a fixed term or undertaking 
agreed by the partners,65 the bankruptcy or death of any partner,66 and 
illegality.67  In addition, it is generally accepted that an English partnership is 
dissolved on any change of membership, because a partnership is defined in s1 of 
the Partnership Act as a “relation” and this relation changes when the partners 
change.68  The effect of a change of partners in Scotland is less clear because of 
the separate legal personality of Scottish partnerships;69 the SLC commented that 
automatic dissolution in such circumstances “might be thought strange” and “sit 
uneasily with the status of the partnership as a juristic person separate from the 
individuals of whom it is composed” but that “it may well be the law”.70 In Sim v 
Howat the Outer House of the Scottish Court of Session held that a change in 
membership created a new partnership which was a separate legal person to the 
old partnership.71 In Jardine-Paterson v Fraser and others it held that even 
though the death of a partner did not cause dissolution under s33 of the 
Partnership Act because there had been agreement to the contrary, the change of 
membership nonetheless meant that it was “a different legal person”.72   
 
																																																								
63 Op. cit. n2.   
64 Section 32(c).   
65 Section 32(a).   
66 Section 33(1).   
67 Section 34.   
68 Law Commissions’ Joint Report op. cit. n15 at 2.6, R I’Anson Banks “Lindley & Banks on 
Partnership”, 19th edn (2010) Sweet and Maxwell, London at 3.04 and Morse op. cit. n49 at p225 cf 
Blackett-Ord and Haren op. cit. n49 at 16.1.  This is subject to express statutory provision to the 
contrary; for example s32 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 provides that the 
authorisation of a firm to carry on regulated activities in the name of the firm is not affected by any 
change in its membership.   
69 Law Commissions’ Joint Report op. cit. n15 at 2.8 and 8.7.   
70 SLC Report op. cit. n9 at 2.22.  
71 [2011] CSOH 115, [2011] GWD 24-580 per Lord Hodge at para 13.  The court held that there was a 
presumption in Scottish (but not English) law that if a new partnership took over the assets of the old 
partnership and maintained its business as a going concern without giving value for those assets that, 
in the absence of contrary agreement with creditors of the old partnership, the effect was of a binding 
unilateral undertaking by the new partnership to pay the debts of the old partnership to third parties 
(per Lord Hodge at para 33).   
72 (1974) SLT 93 per Lord Maxwell at p97.  The court concluded, however, that in relation to a third 
party contract, the issue was whether the third party had intended to contract with the firm as then 
constituted or as consisted from time to time.  See also In re Rogers, deceased [2006] EWHC 753 
(Ch) [2006] 1 WLR 1577 on the same issue in relation to the appointment of executors in a will of a 
partnership which subsequently became an LLP.   
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Ease of dissolution, combined with the ruling in Balmer that a dissolved 
partnership cannot be prosecuted,73 led the SLC to propose changes to the law on 
dissolution modelled on the draft Bill contained in the Law Commissions’ Joint 
Report (“the joint draft Bill”).74   This provided, inter alia, for English as well as 
Scottish partnerships to have separate legal personality,75 for “break up” rather 
than dissolution to end the partnership’s ability to carry on business (other than 
for the purposes of winding up) with dissolution of the partnership as a separate 
legal entity postponed until the completion of the winding up, and for break up to 
occur only if the number of partners fell below two, the partners agreed, or the 
court so ordered.76   
 
A significant difficulty with this approach is that one of the preconditions for the 
dissolution of a partnership which has broken up was that “there is no risk of the 
partnership incurring any liabilities in the future as a result of any past acts or 
omissions”.77 As the SLC argued, these “liabilities” may not include the liability to 
criminal prosecution for a number of reasons.78  Not only is criminal liability not 
generally extinguished by the passage of time,79 so if dissolution were to hinge on 
such extinction it might never happen, but the joint draft Bill generally focused on 
the civil law and interpreting “liabilities” as referring only to civil liabilities would 
be consistent with this focus.80 In addition, the possibility of “liabilities” being 
considered to include criminal liabilities may simply have been overlooked when 
drafting the clauses on dissolution particularly given that, as discussed above, the 
joint draft Bill provided that an English partnership should not generally be 
capable of committing a criminal offence unless a statute expressly provided 
otherwise.81  Although the SLC noted that it is illogical to distinguish between civil 
and criminal liabilities by retaining the separate legal personality of a partnership 
after break up in respect of one but not the other, its conclusion that the courts 
would therefore be unlikely to interpret the legislation in this way is not 
convincing given the strength of the opposing arguments. Indeed, the SLC itself 
proposed amending the joint draft Bill so that the reference to “liabilities” 
expressly included criminal liability.82  This would avoid the illogicality of 
continuing civil but not criminal liability, but it is not clear when dissolution would 
then occur, given the SLC’s own acknowledgment that potential criminal liability 
is generally not subject to time limits and thus not ever extinguished.  Given both 
this and the fact that criminal liability is predicated on individual autonomy 
																																																								
73 Op. cit. n2.   
74 The preferences of respondents to the consultation largely supported this (SLC Report op. cit. n9 at 
2.8-2.11); see, for example, The Law Society of Scotland “Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper 
on Criminal Liability of Partnerships: Response/Written Evidence” August 2011. 
75 Law Commissions’ Joint Report op. cit. n15 at clause 1(3) of the joint draft Bill.   
76 Law Commissions’ Joint Report op. cit. n15 at 8.1-8.30 and clauses 38-45 of the joint draft Bill.   
77 Law Commissions’ Joint Report op. cit. n15 at clause 45(5) of the joint draft Bill.   
78 SLC Discussion Paper op. cit. n8 at 5.10-5.12. 
79 However, information charging a summary offence to be tried in a magistrates’ court must be laid 
within six months of the commission of the offence (s127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980).  Delay 
is also a relevant factor when Crown prosecutors consider whether it is in the public interest that 
proceedings should be brought (unless the offence is serious, the delay is caused by the defendant, 
the offence has only recently come to light, the complexity of the offence has required a long 
investigation, or new investigative techniques have been used to examine an unsolved crime and have 
resulted in a defendant being identified) (4.17(f) of the Code for Crown Prosecutors, available at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/code_for_crown_prosecutors/ [accessed 22 October 2013]); the 
Attorney General’s consent to prosecution is required where more than three years have elapsed 
between injury and death (s2 of the Law Reform (Year and a Day Rule) Act 1996); and a prosecution 
may be dismissed if no fair trial is possible because substantial delays have caused prejudice to the 
defendant (Attorney-General's Reference (No. 1 of 1990) [1992] QB 630) or trial has not taken place 
within a reasonable time (Article 6(1) ECHR).   
80 SLC Discussion Paper op. cit. n8 at 5.11.   
81 Law Commissions’ Joint Report op. cit. n15 at clause 8 of the joint draft Bill.   
82 SLC Report op. cit. n9 at 2.10-2.11.  See further Jones and Christie op. cit. n31 at 2.39-2.40.   
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whereas joint and several liability is well established in civil law, it might be 
entirely logical to treat criminal and civil liability differently.   
 
In any event, although the SLC described the comprehensive reform of 
partnership law set out in the Law Commissions’ Joint Report83 as “the most 
appropriate long-term solution to the dissolution issue”,84 the government had 
already expressly declined to take those reforms forward85 (other than a very 
small selection of clauses applicable to limited partnerships only86) and the SLC 
acknowledged that “no legislative opportunity will be available in the near 
future”.87  It also noted that in the time taken for any general reform to be 
enacted, and the subsequent transitional period,88 cases could arise in which 
serious criminal charges could not be prosecuted. Indeed, although Balmer may 
have been the first prosecution of a Scottish partnership on indictment in 100 
years, there has since been at least one other such prosecution.89 
 
The SLC therefore concluded that these factors favoured - “in addition to the 
recommended comprehensive reform” - a more targeted and speedy solution in 
the form of a statute providing that a partnership be treated, for the purposes of 
the criminal law only, as having continuing legal personality after dissolution for a 
period of five years.90  For the avoidance of doubt, it also proposed an express 
statutory provision that a partnership could be prosecuted after a change in 
membership for an offence committed before the change.91 The PPS Act does not 
refer to legal personality but ss1 and 4 simply provide that neither dissolution nor 
a change of membership will affect the prosecution of the partnership or of a 
partner and that a dissolved partnership may be prosecuted during the five years 
following dissolution. 
 
Continued separate legal personality “for certain purposes and not for others”92 is 
a radical departure from the current law pursuant to which personality, as Lord 
Eassie stated in Balmer,93 “is not created or extinguished in slices or 
instalments”.94  Furthermore, a time limit on continuing liability after dissolution 
is necessarily arbitrary, albeit required in order to balance the reasonable needs 
of the State to have sufficient time to discover the offence and prepare the 
prosecution (two and a half years in Balmer) against the uncertainty for partners 
and their creditors, and would align with the five year limitation period for most 
civil claims in Scotland.  
 
Equivalent provisions permitting an English partnership to be treated as 
continuing for the purposes of criminal proceedings brought against it would be 
both desirable, in order to ensure that the perpetrator of a crime is held to 
account, and possible, although a choice would have to be made as to whether to 
																																																								
83 Op. cit. n15.   
84 SLC Report op. cit. n9 at 2.12.   
85 Written ministerial statement on Partnership Reform by Ian McCartney, Minister for Trade 
Investment and Foreign Affairs, 20 July 2006.   
86 The Legislative Reform (Limited Partnerships) Order 2009 SI 2009/1940.   
87 SLC Report op. cit. n9 at 2.12.   
88 The SLC Report refers to a “need” for a “substantial” transitional period (op. cit. n9 at 2.12) and 
notes that the Law Commissions’ Joint Report (op. cit. n15 at 14.15) suggested a two year period.   
89 Frank Mulholland QC, Lord Advocate, Special Public Bill Committee Partnerships (Prosecution) 
(Scotland) Bill [HL], (HL) 2012-2013 119.  See also the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) Public 
Register of Convictions which indicates that there have been dozens of successful prosecutions against 
partnerships, available at http://www.hse.gov.uk/prosecutions/default.asp [accessed 22 October 
2013]).   
90 SLC Report op. cit. n9 at 2.13.   
91 SLC Report op. cit. n9 at 2.23-2.24.   
92 SLC Discussion Paper op. cit. n8 at 5.24.   
93 Op. cit. n2.   
94 Balmer op. cit. n2 per Lord Eassie at para 80.   
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align the time limit with Scottish law (five years) or with the commonest 
limitation period in civil actions in England (six years).95   
 
4 The liability of partners  
In certain circumstances, partners may incur criminal or civil liability, either in 
addition to or default of partnership criminal liability. As with the more common 
contractual or tortious liability, there is a strong argument that the civil 
consequences of partnership criminal liability should fall on the partners, since 
they are in a relationship of mutual trust and good faith96 and thus able to 
evaluate and supervise one another, rather than on third party creditors 
(including the State in relation to criminal fines) who are not. The possibility of 
individual criminal liability reduces the risk that no one will be held to account for 
criminal acts involving a partnership, and may encourage compliance by 
partnerships with statutory duties.97 However, unless it is additional rather than 
alternative to partnership liability, it runs the risk that “[o]ne individual carrying 
the responsibility for fault permits business to proceed as usual”98 and thus that 
structures and policies which encourage or facilitate criminal behaviour will 
persist. 
 
Furthermore, as will now be discussed, the law is currently unclear both as to 
when individual partners will incur civil liability for partnership fines, and when 
they will incur criminal liability for offences committed by the partnership or other 
partners.     
 
a) Civil liability for criminal penalties awarded against the 
partnership.   
A partnership is, of course, liable to the extent of its assets for any fines or 
penalties imposed on it as a result of its criminal acts.  This has an indirect impact 
on the partners since the value of their interests in the business is thereby 
diminished.  However, where a fine imposed on a partnership cannot be paid from 
its assets, either because they are insufficient, or because the partnership has 
dissolved and thus no longer exists so as to be able to own assets, the question 
arises as to whether the fine can be enforced against the personal assets of the 
partners or former partners.   
 
As discussed above, s10 of the Partnership Act makes a partnership liable for the 
wrongful acts of its partners.  Section 9 of the Partnership Act read with s3 of the 
Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 makes partners jointly and severally liable 
for “all debts and obligations of the firm”, which can include fines imposed in 
criminal proceedings99 as well as damages awarded in civil proceedings.  Section 
17 of the Partnership Act provides that, subject to contrary agreement, partners 
are under a continuing liability after they leave the partnership for debts and 
obligations incurred while they were partners, and s44 provides that partners 
remain liable after dissolution to make good any deficiency in the partnership 
assets (in the proportion in which they were entitled to share profits).  Thus, the 
general rule is that partners are personally liable for fines and penalties imposed 
on the partnership.   
 
																																																								
95 Limitation Act 1908.   
96 Const v Harris (1824) Turn & R 496, 37 ER 1191.   
97 SLC Discussion Paper op. cit. n8 at 6.13.  See also HG Van de Bunt “Corporate Crime” (1994) 2(1) 
JFC 11.   
98 Norrie op. cit. n7 at p102.   
99 Lloyd v Grace Smith & Co [1912] AC 716.  See also Flynn v Thomson and partners op. cit. n52 and 
Blackett-Ord and Haren op. cit. n49 at 19.45.   
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The position has, however, been complicated by the ruling in R v W Stevenson & 
Sons (A Partnership).100  A number of English – but not Scottish - statutes 
expressly provide that where an offence is committed by a partnership any fine 
imposed is to be paid out of partnership assets and partners will incur liability if 
the crime is committed with their consent or connivance or as a result of their 
neglect.101 Such provisions may simply confirm that, despite an English 
partnership’s lack of separate legal personality, its assets are nonetheless 
available to meet a fine imposed upon it.102  Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal in 
Stevenson argued that they indicated that a fine could be imposed only on 
partnership assets, and therefore not on the personal assets of the partners, so 
superseding the usual position as set out in the Partnership Act.  It held that that 
even where, as in Stevenson, the legislation103 omitted such a provision, this 
must be by accident rather than design and so it should be interpreted in the 
same way.  It argued that enforcing a fine imposed on a partnership against 
partners personally would largely negate the scheme of the legislation in 
question, under which a partner did not incur criminal liability unless the offence 
was committed with his consent and connivance or was attributable to his 
neglect.  
 
This approach can be criticised on a number of grounds.  First, imposing civil 
liability on the partners in the form of the financial consequences of the 
partnership’s conviction does not equate to imposing criminal liability on them, 
and would thus not interfere with the legislative scheme for the latter.  In any 
case, it is an inevitable result of ss9 and 10 of the Partnership Act.104  Second, it 
achieves de facto achievement limited liability despite the absence of any clear 
statutory provision for such a limitation.105  Third, it contrasts with s4(2) of the 
Partnership Act, which expressly provides that an individual partner in a Scottish 
partnership may be charged on a decree (equivalent to final judgment in 
England) or diligence (a legal process enforcing a decree against a debtor) 
directed against the partnership (albeit being entitled to pro rata repayment from 
the partnership and the other partners).  This provision was presumably intended 
to confirm that although a Scottish partnership is a separate legal person, its 
partners can nonetheless be pursued for its debts. However, it would be ironic if 
an English partnership’s lack of separate legal personality, and the resulting lack 
of a similar provision, led to a degree of limited liability for English partners not 
enjoyed by their Scottish counterparts.  It is therefore submitted that statutory 
provisions for fines to be paid from partnership assets ought to have been 
interpreted simply as clarifying that those assets are available, and not as 
introducing an exception to the basic principle of partners’ unlimited liability for 
debts and liabilities of the partnership.   
 
																																																								
100 [2008] EWCA Crim 273 [2008] Cr App R 14.   
101 For example, s15(3) of the Bribery Act 2010, s14(3) of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate 
Homicide Act 2007 and s31(7) of the Serious Crime Act 2007.  Other statutes make equivalent 
provision in relation to unincorporated associations; for example, s1130(3) of the Companies Act 2006 
and s403 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 The Law Commission of England and Wales 
has proposed removing the possibility of liability for neglect from those consent and connivance 
provisions which currently include it, although it also raised the possibility of a new offence of 
“negligently failing to prevent” the commission of an offence (“Criminal Liability in Regulatory 
Contexts” op. cit. n12 at 7.35-7.52). 
102 SLC Discussion Paper op. cit. n8 at 3.23-3.25.   
103 The Sea Fishing (Enforcement of Community Control Measures) Order 2000 SI 2000/51.   
104 SLC Discussion Paper op. cit. n8 at 3.20-3.21 and Morse op. cit. n49 at 4.33.  Morse, however, 
notes that s10 might be limited to liability for the acts of other partners and not apply to acts of the 
partnership.   
105 SLC Discussion Paper op. cit. n8 at 3.27.  See also Richard Keen QC, Dean of the Faculty of 
Advocates, Special Public Bill Committee op. cit. n89.   
This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication which 
has been edited, corrected and updated after this draft was prepared.  It should not be cited in 
this draft version without the consent of the author.	
	
	 14
In Scotland, ss70 and 143 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 
(discussed above) enable the prosecution of partnerships and the recovery as a 
civil debt of any penalty imposed.  Together with the Partnership Act provisions, 
the SLC considered that these enable enforcement of a partnership fine against 
partners’ assets if the partnership assets are inadequate, unless there is express 
statutory provision to the contrary,106 and prevent an inference being drawn from 
consent and connivance provisions that a partner’s assets are not otherwise 
available to meet the partnership’s civil liability.107  Even so, the risk that 
Stevenson might be applied led it to propose what is now s3 of the PPS Act, that 
any enactment restricting payment of a partnership fine to partnership assets be 
disapplied in the case of a dissolved partnership.108 In Scottish cases not 
involving dissolution - and in all English cases - there remains a risk that 
Stevenson might be applied. 
 
A further difficulty in this connection is establishing which partners should be 
personally liable where there has been a change of membership between the 
commission of the offence and the conviction of the partnership.  Again, this 
reflects the tension inherent in applying individualist criminal law to an 
aggregation of individuals.  The general rule, reflected in ss9, 10 and 17 of the 
Partnership Act, is that the liability of the firm must have been incurred while the 
person was a partner and so an incoming partner is not liable for debts or 
obligations incurred prior to his admission.  It is submitted that the partnership’s 
criminal liability is incurred at the time at which the offence is committed, not 
when it is convicted, and thus personal liability for any fines that the partnership 
is unable to pay falls upon those who were partners at the time the offence was 
committed.109  This is not only the fairest approach, since any corresponding civil 
liability is imposed on those who were partners at the time of the wrongdoing and 
thus had the opportunity to prevent it, but is consistent with the approach taken, 
at least by the Australian courts, to the analogous problem in tort claims, 
whereby liability has been imposed on those who were partners at the time of the 
firm’s breach of duty and not at the later date at which damage is suffered and 
the cause of action strictly accrued.110  It is also consistent with the approach 
taken to contractual claims where liability is incurred by the partners at the date 
at which the cause of action accrued, for example when the contractual 
obligations were breached, not at the later date on which proceedings were 
commenced.111  It is true that this could lead to practical difficulties, particularly 
in the event of insolvency, in establishing which partners are liable to make good 
which partnership debts and obligations,112 but this is a consequence of the 
provisions of the Partnership Act and is already the case for civil claims without 
having led to significant problems.   
 
However, during the legislative passage of the PPS Act it was asserted that the 
partners who would be personally liable for fines if the partnership’s own assets 
																																																								
106 SLC Discussion Paper op. cit. n8 at 3.4-3.16.   
107 SLC Discussion Paper op. cit. n8 at 3.21-3.25.   
108 SLC Report op. cit. n9 at 3.7.   
109 See also John Paul Sheridan of the Law Society of Scotland, Special Public Bill Committee op. cit. 
n89.   
110 State of South Australia v Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co and others [1997] SASC 6129 and Blackett- 
and Haren op. cit. n49 at 19.56.  Sections 9, 10 and 17 of the South Australian Partnership Act 1891-
1975 are, in material respects, identical to the corresponding sections of the Partnership Act 1890.  
However, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, Special Public Bill Committee op. cit. n89, appeared to suggest 
that tort liability would fall on those who were partners at the time of the judgment and not at the 
time of the negligent act.   
111 Marsden v Guide Dogs for the Blind [2004] EWHC 593 Ch [2004] 3 Costs LR 378.   
112 See further Richard Keen QC, Dean of the Faculty of Advocates and Lord Wallace of Tankerness, 
Special Public Bill Committee op. cit. n89 and David Mundell Partnerships (Prosecution) (Scotland) Bill 
Deb 19 March 2013, cols. 3-18.   
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were insufficient would be the partners at the time of the conviction,113 and a 
warning to this effect is now contained in the guidance to the Act.114  Not only is 
this unfair to partners who joined the firm after the offence was committed,115 but 
a sentencing court might be deterred from imposing an appropriately severe fine 
by the possibility of it being met largely by partners who were not culpable.116  
Although incoming partners could negotiate an indemnity for such liability117 or 
bring a claim for breach of the duty of good faith118 or misrepresentation,119 the 
risk that some partners would be unaware of the need to negotiate an indemnity, 
or that any such indemnity or claim could prove to be worthless, led to the 
proposal of amendments to the PPS Act.  Two possibilities were put forward: the 
express exemption of such partners from liability,120 or a statutory duty of 
disclosure on existing partners with exemption of new partners if they could 
nonetheless prove lack of knowledge of the offence.121 The former was only 
withdrawn in the House of Lords pending the issue being addressed in the House 
of Commons,122 and the latter was only withdrawn in the Commons on the basis 
that the SLC would “keep the operation of this provision under review, and that a 
more comprehensive analysis of the potential reform of partnership law remains a 
possibility”.123 It is therefore to be hoped (albeit not expected) that such 
monitoring or, failing that, legislative change, ensures that those who were not 
partners at the time of the offence are not subjected to personal liability.   
 
b) Individual criminal liability for offences committed by the 
partnership or other partners 
i) Vicarious liability 
Although s5 of the Partnership Act provides that a partner is the agent of the 
partnership and the other partners, and they can thus incur vicarious liability for 
his acts, the reverse is not true: a partnership is not the agent of its partners and 
so partners cannot incur vicarious liability for acts of the partnership.  As 
discussed above, criminal liability is generally imposed only in relation to a 
defendant’s own criminal acts, and therefore partners cannot normally be held 
vicariously liable for the acts of other partners or the partnership unless, as 
discussed below, there is express statutory provision to the contrary.124  Thus in 
Bennett v Richardson the court held that the offence of using a car which was not 
in good repair and in respect of which the user had no insurance, contrary to the 
Road Traffic Acts 1972 and 1974, could not be committed by a person merely 
because he was in partnership with the driver.125   
 
																																																								
113 Patrick Layden QC, Scottish Law Commissioner, and Lord Wallace of Tankerness, Special Public Bill 
Committee op. cit. n89.   
114 Guidance on the impact of the Partnerships (Prosecution) (Scotland) Act 2013, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/193536/Guidance-
for-Partnerships-Act.pdf [accessed 22 October 2013].   
115 See, for example, Viscount Hanworth and the Law Society of Scotland, Special Public Bill 
Committee op. cit. n89.   
116 Professor James Chalmers of the Law Society of Scotland, Special Public Bill Committee op. cit. 
n89.   
117 Patrick Layden QC, Scottish Law Commissioner, and Richard Keen QC, Dean of the Faculty of 
Advocates, Special Public Bill Committee op. cit. n89.   
118 Fiona Bruce and David Mundell, Partnerships (Prosecution) (Scotland) Bill Deb 19 March 2013 op. 
cit. n112.   
119 David Mundell, Partnerships (Prosecution) (Scotland) Bill Deb 19 March 2013 op. cit. n112.   
120 Viscount Hanworth, Special Public Bill Committee op. cit. n89.   
121 William Bain MP, Partnerships (Prosecution) (Scotland) Bill Deb 19 March 2013 op. cit. n112.   
122	Viscount Hanworth, Special Public Bill Committee op. cit. n89.  	
123	William Bain MP, Partnerships (Prosecution) (Scotland) Bill Deb 22 April 2013, cols 693-697 at 696.   
124 See, for example, Meridian Global Funds Maintenance Asia Ltd v Services Commission op. cit. n35 
at 507 and R v W Stevenson & Sons (A Partnership) op. cit. n100.   
125 [1980] RTR 538.  See also Garrett v Hooper [1973] RTR 1.   
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However, in practice, the nature of the partnership relationship is such that a 
partner may in some circumstances be taken to have acted jointly with other 
partners who have committed an offence, and thus be liable himself.  For 
example, in Clode v Barnes the court held that the offence under s1(1) of the 
Trade Descriptions Act 1968 of supplying goods to which a false description had 
been attached did not require proof of mens rea, and thus a partner was liable 
because he was a joint supplier of goods to which his fellow partner had attached 
a false description.126  In Parsons v Barnes the court held that although the mere 
fact of partnership was insufficient to make one partner liable for the criminal acts 
of another, it was appropriate to hold both partners liable for making a false 
statement as to the provision of a service contrary to s14 of the Trade 
Descriptions Act, because “the facts went considerably beyond the simple 
relationship of partners”.  In particular, the defendant had been present when the 
customer and the partner who subsequently carried out the service initially 
inspected and discussed the property to be repaired, and this indicated that the 
partners had “acted in concert throughout”.127   
 
ii) Statutory liability 
A number of statutes expressly impose liability on partners (and, in some cases, 
persons purporting to act as a partner128) for offences committed by the 
partnership. Of these, a few provide that every partner is automatically guilty of 
an offence committed by the partnership, but such strict liability is rare.129 Others 
set a relatively low threshold for partners to incur liability, by reversing the 
burden of proof so that where a partnership is guilty of an offence every partner, 
other than one who is proved to have been ignorant of or to have attempted to 
prevent the commission of the offence, is also guilty of that offence.130  It is, 
however, more common for statutes to adopt the intermediate approach of 
imposing liability on a partner only if the offence is proved to have been 
committed with his “consent or connivance”,131 in some instances with a further 
option of liability if it is merely “attributable to any neglect” on his part.132 
Scottish law also provides that “consent or connivance” provisions which refer 
only to corporate bodies and directors equally to partnerships and their partners 
(including persons purporting to act as a partner).133  Partners in both 
jurisdictions can also incur liability under equivalent provisions applicable to 
members of unincorporated associations,134 and under statutes that impose 
liability on any person where the commission of the offence by another person is 
“due to [their] act or default”.135    
 
iii) Secondary liability and joint enterprise 
A partner may incur liability as a secondary party by virtue of s8 of the 
Accessories and Abettors Act 1861.  This makes it an offence to “aid, abet, 
																																																								
126 [1974] 1 WLR 544.   
127 [1973] Crim LR 537 at 538.   
128 For example, s400 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and s76 of the Health Act 2006.   
129 For example, s341 of the Gambling Act 2005 and s138 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum 
Act 2002.   
130 For example, s108 of the Friendly Societies Act 1992 and s101 of the Trade Marks Act 1994. The 
Court of Human Rights has held that Article 6 ECHR requires presumptions in criminal law to be kept 
within reasonable limits which take into account the importance of what is at stake and maintain the 
rights of the defence (Salabiaku v France (1988) 13 EHRR 379 at para 28; see also Hoang v France 
(1992) 16 EHRR 53).   
131 For a discussion of the meaning of consent and connivance see the Law Commission ”Reforming 
Bribery” Consultation Paper No 185 (2007) at 9.27-9.35.   
132 For example, ss10 and 36 of the Administration of Justice Act 1985, and s1255 of the Companies 
Act 2006.  
133 Section 53 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010.   
134 For example, s23(3) of the Private Security Industry Act 2001.   
135 For example, s36 of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and s81 of the Agriculture Act 
1970.   
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counsel, or procure the commission” of a statutory or common law offence,136 
terms which have been held to have, in principle, different meanings137 but which 
also have some commonality.  For example, there is some consensus that aiding 
requires assistance but not causation or even awareness on the part of the 
principal offender; abetting and counseling require intentional encouragement 
which is communicated to the principal offender, but not causation; procuring 
requires actions that cause the principal offence, although the principal offender 
need not be aware of this.138   
 
However, the commission of the offence by the principal – the partnership or 
another partner - must be established before secondary liability can be 
established.139 Furthermore, mere neglect will not give rise to secondary liability.  
Thus, in the corporate context, the courts have held that neither a director nor a 
senior employee of a company will incur liability for aiding and abetting an 
offence committed by an employee unless he knows of the offence, is able to 
control the actions of the offender and deliberately refrains from doing so.140  
Such knowledge may be inferred if he “deliberately refrained from making 
enquiries the results of which he did not care to have”, but not where he merely 
fails to make such enquiries as a reasonable person would have made.141  This 
presumably means that a partner will not incur secondary liability merely by the 
fact of being in partnership with a wrongdoer.   
 
Secondary liability can also arise under the common law doctrine of joint 
enterprise.142 Joint enterprise may arise where two (or more) persons agree to 
carry out a common criminal purpose and each contributes to the conduct 
element, in which case both are liable as principals; or where only one person 
carries out the conduct element but does so with the encouragement or 
assistance of the other; or where a person who is liable as joint principal or 
accessory for one offence foresaw the commission of a second offence by the 
other party which that other then commits.143 In the latter two scenarios, the 
person who encouraged/assisted or foresaw the crime is liable as an accessory.144   
 
iv) Inchoate liability 
																																																								
136 By way of exception, s18(2) of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 
expressly excludes the possibility of individual liability for aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring 
(or, in Scotland, being art and part in) in an offence of corporate homicide.  Section 14 also provides 
that individual partners may not commit the principal offence. 
137 Attorney General’s Reference (No 1 of 1975) [1975] 2 All ER 684 at 686.   
138 See Ormerod op. cit. n45 at pp185-189, AP Simester and GR Sullivan “Simester and Sullivan’s 
Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine” 5th edn (2013) Hart Publishing, Oxford, at pp208-232 and M 
Jefferson “Criminal Law” 10th edn (2011), Longman, Harlow at pp177-180.   
139 See also s293 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1996, which enshrined the common law 
enabling a person to be convicted of an offence when his involvement is art and part (broadly 
equivalent to aiding and abetting).  Thus a partner can be convicted for an offence committed by the 
partnership if he is art and part.  However, the SLC identified a number of potential difficulties with 
this type of liability (SLC Discussion Paper op. cit. n8 at 3.42-3.43).   
140 R v JF Alford Transport Ltd (1997) 2 Cr App R 326 at 332.   
141 R v JF Alford Transport Ltd op. cit. n136 at 332.   
142 R v A and others [2010] EWCA Crim 1622 [2011] QB 841 at paras 9-10 and 37.  See also R Buxton 
“Joint Enterprise” (2009) 4 Crim LR 233, JC Smith “Criminal liability of accessories: law and law 
reform” (1997) 113 LQR 453 and G Virgo “The doctrine of joint enterprise liability” (2010) 10 Arch 
Rev 6. 
143 R v A and others op. cit. n142 at paras 9-10 and CPS “CPS Guidance on: Joint Enterprise Charging 
Decisions” December 2012 http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/assets/uploads/files/Joint_Enterprise.pdf 
[accessed 22 October 2013].   
144 Unless the criminal act was performed in a fundamental different manner or was of a 
fundamentally different kind from any act which he contemplated might be committed (English [1999] 
AC 1) or he has “unequivocally withdraw[n]” before the crime is committed (O’Flaherty [2004] EWCA 
Crim 526, [2004] Crim LR 751).   
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In contrast to secondary liability, which derives directly from the commission of 
the principal offence, inchoate liability can arise even where the intended or 
assisted crime does not take place.  Thus a partner may be liable for 
conspiring,145 inciting,146 assisting or encouraging,147 the partnership or another 
partner to commit a crime.148 
 
5 The effect of partnership dissolution on the individual liability of 
partners 
If a partner does incur liability as discussed above, the question which remains is 
whether this is affected by the dissolution of the partnership.  Although, as 
discussed above, the dissolution of a partnership might be regarded as equivalent 
to the death of an individual wrongdoer, and equally to frustrate the prosecution 
of a case against them, the reality is that those responsible for the acts and 
decisions constituting the crime – the partners – live on, even if the partnership 
does not.   
 
a) Civil liability after dissolution 
Reference has already been made to the Court of Appeal’s ruling in Stevenson149 
that fines or penalties for statutory offences can only be paid from partnership 
assets and not those of the partners, and to the incompatibility of this with a 
number of provisions of the Partnership Act, including s44 which provides that 
partners remain liable after dissolution to make good any deficiencies in the 
partnership assets required to pay the firm’s debts and liabilities.  The problem is 
particularly acute on dissolution since, even where a partnership has sufficient 
assets, they cease to be partnership assets when the partnership itself ceases to 
exist.  Section 3 of the PPS Act which, as discussed above, disapplies in 
dissolution cases any statutory restriction on payment of a partnership fine to 
partnership assets, is therefore to be welcomed, and would be equally valuable in 
relation to English partnerships.   
 
b) Criminal liability after dissolution 
The court in Balmer150 held that dissolution of the partnership prevented its 
prosecution, and the same would apply equally to an English partnership.  
However, it is submitted that once a crime is committed, whether by the 
partnership or by a partner directly, subsequent dissolution of the partnership can 
have no effect on the liability of partners. In R v Wakefield151 the former partners 
of a dissolved partnership were prosecuted in relation to the partnership’s 
unauthorised use of a trade mark contrary to the Trade Marks Act 1994.  Section 
101(4) of that Act provided that where a partnership was guilty of an offence, 
every partner was also guilty unless he was proved to have been ignorant of, or 
to have attempted to prevent the commission of, the offence. The Court of Appeal 
																																																								
145 Section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977 makes it an offence to agree to pursue a course of 
conduct which will lead to the commission of an offence, or would do so but for the existence of facts 
which render such commission impossible. Distinguishing between the actus reus and mens rea in 
relation to the agreement is particularly difficult; see Anderson [1986] AC 27.  The Act largely 
abolished the common law offence of conspiracy but the offences of conspiracy to defraud, to corrupt 
public morals and to outrage public decency still exist.  The scope and continued existence of these 
offences have been widely criticised; see, for example, Ormerod op. cit. n45 pp447-458.   
146 Section 59 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 abolished incitement at common law; statutory offences 
remain.  
147 Sections 44, 45 and 46 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 make it an offence to encourage or assist an 
offence either intentionally, or believing that it will be committed or believing that it will be committed 
that his act will encourage or assist its commission.  
148 Attempting to commit a crime is also an inchoate offence (s1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 
1981).   
149 Op. cit. n100.   
150 Op. cit. n2.   
151 [2004] EWCA Crim 2278 (2004) 168 JP 505.   
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held that that the only condition precedent to the conviction of the partners under 
s101(4) was that the partnership should have been guilty of the offence, and it 
was not necessary for it to have been convicted.  The court did not explicitly 
address the impact of the partnership’s dissolution, as opposed to the consequent 
absence of a conviction, but it is evident that dissolution was no bar to the 
conviction of the individual partners.   
 
In Balmer the court considered that although dissolution of the partnership 
prevented its prosecution under ss3 and 33 of the Health and Safety at Work etc 
Act 1974 (discussed above), it would not have prevented the prosecution of 
individual partners under s36 of that Act, which creates individual liability for an 
offence committed by an employer if its commission was due to the act or default 
of that individual.152  Admittedly, the argument in that relation to that offence 
was strengthened by the express statement in s36 that liability is incurred 
regardless of whether proceedings are taken against the employer.153 
 
The lack of direct Scottish authority on the impact of dissolution or a change of 
membership (which may or may not cause dissolution; see above), led the SLC to 
propose, for the avoidance of doubt, a statutory provision that the competency of 
criminal proceedings against a partner in relation to an offence committed by the 
partnership is not affected by dissolution or a change in membership.154 Sections 
2 and 5 of the PPS Act makes provision accordingly, but also provide that 
proceedings against individual partners may not be brought where the 
partnership has been acquitted.155  An equivalent provision could similarly clarify 
English law.   
 
6 LLPs 
a) Whether LLPs can incur liability 
Like Scottish partnerships, and unlike English partnerships, LLPs in both 
jurisdictions have separate legal personality from their members.156  An LLP may 
thus, in principle, commit and be liable for criminal offences, including common 
law offences, in the same way as a Scottish partnership or indeed a company.157  
 
b) When and how LLPs can incur liability 
It is likely that the courts will be prepared to attribute the acts and mental state 
of LLP members to an LLP as they have done in relation to companies (discussed 
above), since an LLP is similarly both a legal person and a body corporate, 
although equivalent difficulties may arise in attributing the necessary mens rea 
and actus reus to an LLP.  
 
In addition, an LLP is vicariously liable for a “wrongful act or omission” of a 
member pursuant to s6(4) of the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 in the 
same way that a partnership is liable for the wrongdoing of a partner under s10 
of the Partnership Act (discussed above), except that s6(4) only requires the act 
or omission to be in the course of the business, rather than the ordinary course, 
																																																								
152 No such charge had been brought in the case; as the court noted (at para 82 of Balmer), the 
indictment accused only the partnership, and Frank Mulholland QC, Lord Advocate, Special Public Bill 
Committee op. cit. n89, stated that there had been no evidence in Balmer to support individual 
prosecutions.   
153 Balmer op. cit. n2 at para 82.  
154 SLC Report op. cit. n9 at 4.1-4.3.   
155 Section 5 of the PPS Act.   
156 Section 1(2) of the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000.   
157 See, in relation to companies, R v Great North of England Rly Co (1846) 2 Cox CC 70 115 ER 1294  
(public nuisance); R v JG Hammond & Co Ltd [1914] 2 KB 866 (contempt of court); R v ICR Haulage 
Ltd [1944] KB 551, [1944] 1 All ER 691, CCA (conspiracy to defraud); Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd v 
Lancegaye Safety Glass (1939) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 395, [1939] 2 All ER 613, CA (criminal libel).   
This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication which 
has been edited, corrected and updated after this draft was prepared.  It should not be cited in 
this draft version without the consent of the author.	
	
	 20
and does not refer to the possibility of a penalty being imposed.  It is not 
considered that anything turns on these differences and s6(4) is apt to include 
criminal liability in the same way as s10 of the Partnership Act.158 
 
c) The impact of dissolution  
A key difference between LLPs and partnerships in this context is that the risk of 
an LLP dissolving after committing an offence and before being prosecuted is 
much less than of a partnership doing so because, unlike a partnership, an LLP 
cannot dissolve automatically on the happening of a particular event.  It may only 
be dissolved on publication of a notice that it has been struck off by the Registrar 
on the application of a majority of the members (voluntary striking off),159 or on 
his own initiative because it is not carrying on business160 or has been wound up 
and there is no liquidator acting or he has failed to make the necessary 
returns.161 Even if an LLP is dissolved, an application for restoration may by made 
by one of a number of specified persons, including a person with a potential legal 
claim against the LLP.162  An application for restoration may be made at any time 
within six years,163 and the effect of restoration is that the LLP is deemed to have 
continued in existence as if it had not been dissolved or struck off.164 A 
prosecution can then be brought against it, unless an administration or winding 
up order has been made, in which case the institution of proceedings is subject to 
the consent of the administrator or the leave of the court.165     
 
d) The liability of members   
Another key difference between LLPs and partnerships impacts on individual civil 
liability for any fines levied on the firm. Unlike an English partnership, an LLP has 
separate legal personality from its members, and unlike both English and Scottish 
partnerships, individual members incur no personal liability in the event that the 
LLP has insufficient funds to meet its debts.166 Of course, the value of individual 
																																																								
158 J Whittaker and J Machell “The Law of Limited Liability Partnerships” 3rd edn (2009) Bloomsbury 
Professional, Haywards Heath, at 5.23.   
159 If it has not within the previous three months traded or acted otherwise than for winding up, there 
are no insolvency proceedings pending, and notice of the application is given to the members and 
employees (ss1003-1008 CA 2006 as modified by Reg 51 of the Limited Liability Partnerships 
(Application of Companies Act 2006) Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/1804) (“the LLP Regulations 2009”)).    
160 Section 1000 of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) as modified by Reg 50 of the LLP Regulations 
2009 op. cit. n159.      
161 Section 1001 CA 2006 as modified by Reg 50 of the LLP Regulations 2009 op. cit. n159.    
162 The Registrar may restore an LLP on the application of a former member if the LLP was struck off 
on the Registrar’s own initiative and was, at the time of striking off, still carrying on business, and 
provided that various procedural requirements are met (ss1024-1028 CA 2006 as modified by Reg 56 
of the LLP Regulations 2009 op. cit. n159).  If the Registrar refuses to restore the LLP, the former 
member may make an application to the court (s1030 CA 2006 as modified by Reg 57).  The court 
may order restoration on such an application, or on the application of any of the persons listed in 
s1029(2) as modified by Reg 57, if the requirements of ss1004-1009 as modified by Reg 51 were not 
met (because, at the time of striking off, the LLP was still active or insolvency proceedings were 
pending or the proper notices to members and employees were not given) or if it considers it just to 
restore the LLP (ss1029 and 1031 CA 2006 as modified by Reg 57). 
163 Sections 1024(4) and 1030(4) CA 2006 as modified by Regs 56 and 57 of the LLP Regulations 2009 
op. cit. n159.  By way of exception, an application to the court for restoration for the purpose of 
bringing proceedings against the LLP for damages for personal injury may be made at any time so 
long as the contemplated proceedings are not themselves time barred (s1030(1)-(3) and (6) CA 2006 
as modified by Reg 57).  An application to the court by a former member whose application to the 
Registrar has been refused may also be made beyond the six year time limit so long as it is brought 
within 28 days of the refusal (s1030(5) CA 2006 as modified by Reg 57 of the LLP Regulations 2009).   
164 Sections 1028 and 1032 CA 2006 as modified by Regs 56 and 57 of the LLP Regulations 2009 op. 
cit. n159.    
165 Sections 117 and 130 IA 1986 as modified by Sch 3 to the Limited Liability Partnerships 
Regulations 2001 SI 2001/1090 (“the LLP Regulations 2001”) and para 43 of Sch B1 to IA 1986 as 
applied by Reg 5 of those Regulations.   
166 Section 1 of the LLP Act.  Although LLP members may agree to make a contribute in the event the 
LLP is wound up (s1(4) of the LLP Act and s74 IA 1986 as applied by the LLP Regulations 2001 op. cit. 
n165) it is understood that such agreements are rare.   
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LLP members’ interests in the firm is reduced by any fines levied on it, just as 
partners’ interests are.  
 
The potential criminal liability of members is similar to that of partners.  First, 
although s6(1) of the LLP Act makes an LLP member an agent only of the LLP, 
and not of the other members (unlike partners who are agents of the partnership 
and each other167), vicarious liability will arise only rarely in any event (see 
above).  Second, LLP members are largely subject to the same statutory offences 
in connection with their membership of the firm.168 
 
7 Conclusion 
The PPS Act is clearly to be welcomed as remedying the defects in Scottish law 
made apparent in Balmer.169 The problem of dissolution preventing prosecution is 
solved by permitting a partnership to be prosecuted within five years of 
dissolution, while the related problem of partners’ assets not being available to 
pay partnership fines is solved by disapplying, in the event of dissolution, 
statutory provisions which require a fine levied on a partnership to be paid from 
partnership assets and which might be regarded as precluding recourse to partner 
assets because of the ruling in Stevenson.170 The uncertainty as to whether a 
change in membership of a Scottish partnership causes dissolution is addressed 
by providing that it has no impact on the prosecution of the partnership or the 
partners. Similarly, any uncertainty as to whether dissolution bars criminal 
proceedings against a partner is addressed by providing that it has no effect on 
the competency of such proceedings.  
 
However, in England and Wales both these problems remain unresolved, and the 
uncertainty as to the impact of dissolution on proceedings against a partner 
continues, because the PPS Act applies only to Scottish partnerships.  In addition, 
the problem of establishing whether and when an English partnership can be 
criminally liable remains unresolved; the Law Commissions’ proposal in their Joint 
Report that an English partnership should not be capable of committing an 
offence unless a statute provided that it could has not been adopted, and their 
expectation of a more thorough examination of the criminal liability of 
partnerships remains unfulfilled.  The tensions between the partnership structure 
in which individuals act collectively, and the criminal law which focuses on 
autonomous behaviour by an individual remain.  Moreover, the increased 
divergence between English and Scottish partnership law alongside otherwise 
largely identical statutory provisions in the Partnership Act (and indeed the 
Limited Partnerships Act 1907) is likely to cause confusion and complexity, just as 
the existence of separate legal personality in one jurisdiction but not the other 
has done, for example, as to criminal liability and the impact of a change in 
membership.    
 
One solution would be for equivalent provisions to those in the PPS Act to be 
enacted in English law as discussed above.  However, the SLC itself put forward 
the proposals now enshrined in the PPS Act only as an interim measure pending 
the implementation of its preferred solution, the adoption of the more wide 
ranging reforms to dissolution and other matters (including separate legal 
personality and criminal liability) proposed in the Joint Report.171 These more 
comprehensive reforms, with the clarification suggested by the SLC that a 
partnership is deemed to continue after dissolution for the purposes of criminal as 
																																																								
167 Section 5 of the Partnership Act.   
168 See the statutory provisions referred to at n128, 129, 130 and 132.   
169 Op. cit. n2.   
170 Op. cit. n100.   
171 Law Commissions’ Joint Report op. cit. n15.   
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well as civil liability, would not only solve the serious risk of lack of criminal 
accountability highlighted in Balmer172 but would also provide clarity and 
consistency across the two jurisdictions.  One can only hope that the optimism 
expressed in the SLC Report, that “Ministers at Westminster are open-minded as 
to the desirability of general reform”, is well founded.173 
																																																								
172 Op. cit. n2.   
173 Op. cit. n9 at 2.12.   
 
